Recent empirical analysis suggests that individual national leaders can have large impacts on economic growth. Leaders have strongest effects in autocracies, where they appear to substantially influence both economic growth and the evolution of political institutions. These findings call for increased focus on national economic policies and the means of leadership selection, among other issues. 
I. Introduction
In the large literature on economic growth, the role of national leaders has received relatively little attention. Yet the imperative for such work is increasing: recent empirical evidence suggests substantial roles for individual leaders in explaining national economic growth as well as national institutional change, which can further influence the growth environment.
This article considers the case for studying growth from a leadership perspective, reviews the primary econometric evidence, and discusses open questions.
II. Why Study Leadership?
To frame this question, first consider two opposing views of individual leaders in historical reasoning. At one extreme, the "Great Man" view of history, classically associated with Carlyle (1837), interprets major events largely as consequences of the idiosyncratic actions of a few individuals. At the opposite extreme, classically associated with Tolstoy (1869) and Marx (1852) , individual leaders play little or no role; rather, historical events are understood much more deterministically as the contest of broad social and technological forces. This latter view gained substantial traction in the 20 th Century throughout the social sciences. The apparent inevitability of World War I and Butterfield's (1931) condemnation of earlier historical reasoning promoted the new paradigm, in which individual leaders would play muted roles.
Modern theoretical implementations have provided potentially decisive constraint on leaders through median voter theory (Downs 1957) . More broadly, the presence of "veto players", through opposing political parties or the checks and balances of multiple institutions, can be seen to severely limit an individual leader's actions (Tsebelis 2002 ).
The literature on economic growth has progressed mostly within this 20 th century paradigm. Examinations of the fundamental causes of growth debate between institutions, culture, and geography, which typically operate without reference to the actions of particular personalities. While policy analysis also features in the growth literature, and some growth economists may imagine leaders indirectly as policymakers, leaders themselves are rarely the subject of focus. As one metric, the Web of Science shows that the keywords "economic growth" intersected with "property rights", "international trade", or "Sub-Saharan Africa" produce hundreds of papers each since 1955, while the intersection of "economic growth" with variants of "national leadership" produces only three papers.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons that leadership may be an important object of study in a growth context.
II.1 Institutional constraints are incomplete.
The constraints imposed on leaders from electoral pressures, opposition parties, independent legislatures and judiciaries all vary across countries. Autocracy, where these constraints are weak, is a common form of political organization. More generally, the modern growth literature has emphasized how the "rules of the game" vary across countries and that institutional differences can be powerful sources in explaining different development paths (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2005) . To the extent that the authority embedded in formal institutional rules and the authority embedded in individuals act as substitutes, the increasing visibility of institutional variation in explaining development paths may directly motivate leadership studies.
Classically, Weber's theory of leadership suggests just this point: leaders can have substantial influence, but only when other institutions are weak (Weber 1947) . In a modern theoretical context, information asymmetries, commitment problems, and limited liability all suggest agency for individuals that may be substantial depending on the local rules of the game.
In a modern empirical context, several studies have suggested leader agency in sub-national political environments (e.g. Kalt and Zupan 1984, Besley and Case 1995; Levitt 1996) , and in corporate environments (e.g. Johnson et al. 1985; Bertrand and Schoar 2003) .
II.2 Theory suggests numerous roles for a national decision-maker.
Theories of economic growth that emphasize public goods (e.g., infrastructure, education, health), national policies (e.g., international trade, monetary policy), or national-scale complementarities (e.g., big push mechanisms) all suggest possibly important roles for a national leader. Furthermore, the capacity of leaders to make war or to pursue systematic corruption suggests other means of economy-wide influences.
II.3 Economic growth has substantial medium-run volatility.
Empirically, economic growth within countries is extremely volatile, with one decade's growth rarely looking much like growth the decade before. The correlation in mean growth across consecutive decades within countries averages only 0.3 in the world sample (Easterly et al. 1993 ) with countries regularly experiencing substantial medium-run growth accelerations and growth collapses (Hausmann et al. 2005, Jones and Olken 2008) . To explain such volatility, it is natural to look at influences that change at appropriate frequencies. National leaders, who change sharply and at relevant time scales, are one place to look.
III. The Empirical Evidence: Do Leaders Matter?
Identifying a causative effect of leaders on economic growth is challenging. Even if particular leaders and particular growth episodes are associated, it may be that growth changes drive leadership changes, without a causative effect of leaders. In fact, empirical evidence demonstrates that coups are less likely when growth is good (Londregan and Poole 1990) and that U.S. presidents are less likely to be re-elected during recessions (Fair 1978 As one example, Figure 1 While the dramatic change in growth after Mao's death may suggest leader effects, this is one example and it could be a coincidence. Jones and Olken (2005) analyze all 57 cases of natural and accidental deaths in the world sample and test, on average, whether growth changes in an unusual fashion when leaders die. This approach rejects the hypothesis that leaders have no influence on growth. Moreover, the point estimates suggest substantial effects. Under the assumption that leader quality is independently drawn across leaders, one standard deviation of leader quality is associated with a 1.5 percentage point difference in the annual growth rate -a large effect.
An important additional finding is that leader effects are strongest in autocratic settings, especially in the absence of political parties or legislatures. Meanwhile, the hypothesis of no leader effects cannot be rejected in democratic settings. The findings are therefore quite consistent with Weber's theory of leadership, where leaders can matter substantially but only when they are unconstrained. These results point to an important intersection between institutions and individuals in understanding growth paths.
Further evidence about the relationship between individual leaders and political institutions is found in Jones and Olken (2009) , which studies the effect of assassinations. That paper estimates the effect of assassination-induced leadership change by comparing cases where leaders were killed in assassination attempts with cases where leaders survived assassination attempts. The key identification assumption is that, conditional on a weapon being discharged in pursuit of killing a leader, whether the leader survives the attack can be treated as plausibly exogenous. The main finding with this approach is that the assassination of autocrats substantially increases the probability of democratization, with democratic transitions occurring at three times the background rate. Once again, the finding is limited to autocracies, with assassination of leaders in democracies provoking no institutional change.
Together, these findings suggest that institutions influence the impact of national leaders, and that national leaders can also influence the path of institutions. The constrained leader -the democrat -may have important degrees of agency, but at the level of national economic growth or the national political system, there is little evidence for an effect. The unconstrained leaderthe autocrat -is seen as a powerful force in explaining the growth path, and a powerful force in the evolution of the political system.
IV. Open Questions
If leaders matter to economic growth, then many further questions are raised. (Ferraz and Finan 2008) employs regression discontinuity design across municipalities to demonstrate that higher wages attract greater numbers of candidates, more educated candidates, and electoral winners who fund more public goods. Much more work is needed along these lines, especially in autocratic settings. At the national level, it would be helpful to identify key observable characteristics that can separate good from bad leaders ex-ante of their assumption of authority.
A related subject is the design of institutional systems to produce the right kind of national leaders, i.e. institutional rules or other national features that attract well-intentioned, capable social planners rather than the simply vainglorious, or thieves. The door is open for creative 
